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THE IMPLIED MARKETING COVENANT
IN OIL AND GAS LEASES: SOME NEEDED
CHANGES FOR THE 80's
Bruce M. Kramer* &
Chris Pearson**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the demand for natural gas has resembled the trek
of an amusement park roller coaster-lots of ups and downs. In the
mid to late 1970's the nation experienced an energy shortage upon which
President Carter declared the "moral equivalent of war."' In an attempt
to combat the shortages Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA). 2 At the heart of the NGPA is a pricing structure
which places a significant burden on producers in the form of costly
(in both time and money) administrative requirements.' The normal
market place incentive to seek higher maximum prices under various
NGPA formulae is diluted by the tremendous bureaucratic and administrative transaction costs. 4 The lessee is therefore "encouraged" by the
high transaction costs to accept the first classification for his wells and

Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.
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Associate, Andrews, Davis, Legg, Bixler, Milsten & Murrah, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, Member, Oklahoma Bar.
1. The Energy Problem, President's Address to the Nation, I Pub. Papers 656 (April
18, 1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3348 (1982). The NGPA has been deemed "the most complicated and ambiguous statute ever enacted." Moody & Garten, The Natural Gas Policy
of 1978: Analysis and Overview, 25 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 2-1 (1979). This criticism
is especially true of the pricing provisions. For a discussion of these provisions see Id.
at 2-13 to 2-48. The large expense of compliance with the administrative requirements is
detailed in Oil & Gas J. 207 (Nov. 19, 1979). The president of Sun Gas Co. reported
that, in the past year, his company had "filed 4,500 pounds of paper to receive price
determinations for 1,500 producing wells." Id. Forty-two employees were added to handle
the deluge of paperwork and it was estimated that the cost of administration was 1.5
million dollars.
4. For a detailed discussion of the regulatory scheme relating to the natural gas
industry, see R. Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation Handbook (1980 & Supp. 1982).
*
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gas products. This complacency is exacerbated by the recent decrease
in demand for natural gas.'
Following a period of governmental policies aimed at stimulating
drilling and production in the mid to late 1970's, producers of natural
gas experienced a prolonged downturn in demand which has continued
to date. 6 In 1984 it was estimated that the surplus of natural gas in
the United States has now reached seven trillion cubic feet per year.
This surplus represented about thirty percent of the nation's productive
capacity. 7 The forecast for 1986 reflects a deliverability surplus in excess
of four trillion cubic feet. 8 A natural effect of this current glut is that
an increasing number of wells are being shut-in. 9 On those wells not
shut-in, producers find that they are often unable to market the permitted
levels of production.' 0 In either situation, shut-in or marketing of only
a percentage of production, lessors are unlikely to receive the royalty
payments they expect. It is probable that the above-described scenario
will precipitate an increase in litigation predicated on the lessee's duty
to market natural gas which has been discovered on the leasehold."
This article, anticipating such an increase, attempts to review the lessee's
obligation under the implied covenant to market.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO MARKET

Development of Implied Covenants Generally
One of the most distinctive features of oil and gas leases is
the almost total absence in the ordinary type of lease of express
5. Hagar & Smith, Lingering U.S. Gas Surplus Predicted, Oil & Gas J. 32 (Jan.
2, 1984). This article compiles the results of a survey taken of natural gas producers
throughout the lower forty-eight states. See also AGA: Gas Surplus to Remain Price
Rein, Oil & Gas J.52-53 (Jan. 6, 1986).
6. W. Legg, Natural Gas Producers/Purchasers Interface: Current Status 1-2 (Unpublished Manuscript: presented to the Mineral Law section of the Oklahoma Bar Association November, 1983). The author notes several factors which contributed to the
decline in demand for natural gas: (1) the length and depth of the recession in the early
1980s, (2)decreases in the use of natural gas by the ailing anhydrus ammonia manufacturing
industry, (3) restrictions in the use of natural gas in federal legislation which encouraged
the use of alternative energy sources, (4) conservation measures, (5) unusually warm winters,
and 6) competition caused by lower crude oil prices. Id. See Hagar & Smith, supra note
5, at 32-33.
7. Hagar & Smith, supra note 5, at 32.
8. AGA: Gas Surplus to Remain Price Rein, Oil & Gas J.at 52 (Jan. 6 1986).
9. Hagar & Smith, supra note 5, at 32. The sixty-three producers responding to the
survey reported that forty-six percent of their combined productive capacity of 3.7 billion
cubic feet per day was shut-in. Id. See also W. Legg, supra note 5, at 4 (author notes
that many wells completed when demand was high have been shut-in).
10. W. Legg, supra note 5, at 4.
11. Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price
Regulation, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1473, 1510 (1981).
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clauses protecting the royalty interest of the lessor. It is doubtful

if any other character of legal instrument can be found in which
one of the parties has so much potentially at stake with so little
express contractual protection.2
As noted in the above passage, oil and gas lease forms have traditionally not contained provisions which set out the duties a lessee owes
his lessor. Thus, a lease will generally be silent as to the lessee's duty
to, among other things, drill offset wells, develop the leasehold, protect

against drainage, or market the minerals discovered on the leasehold. 3In the absence of such provisions, however, courts have been willing
to find implied covenants which require the lessee to perform such duties

or suffer the consequences of breach.

4

Implied covenants in oil and gas leases originated at the turn of
the century. 5 In 1905, the landmark case of Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co.'6 was decided. In Brewster the Eighth Circuit stated that where a
lease contains no express provisions regarding the lessee's duty to develop

the lease, it does not follow that the decision as to how to develop the
lease is left solely to the lessee. Rather, the lessee's duty to develop

"arises from the language of the contract when considered in its entirety
''17

12. Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
In Texas, II Tex. L. Rev. 399 (1933).
13. See R. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas 411-12 (2d ed. 1983); M. Merrill,
Covenants Implied In Oil and Gas Leases 19-20 (2d ed. 1940); 5 H. Williams & C.
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 801 (1983). Various reasons have been given for the general
absence of express provisions in oil and gas leases.
The absence of such express covenants is not due to the unwillingness of the
lessee to contract expressly with reference to these matters, but is based upon
the fact that conditions differ so radically in different oil and gas fields ...
that it is for all practical purposes impossible to express in the lease the lessee's
obligations concerning these matters. Leases are almost invariably acquired prior
to the discovery and development of the pool and before a thorough knowledge
of its characteristics is obtainable.
Pressler, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 18 Miss. L.J. 402, 405 (1947).
14. The most often cited authority on implied covenants and their development is
M. Merrill, supra note 13. For a more recent treatment see 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers,
supra note 13, at §§ 801-804.
15. One of the earliest reported cases isStoddard v.Emery, 128 Pa. 436, 18 A. 339
(1889). In that case the court stated: "Had there been nothing said in the contract [on
the duty to drill additional wells] there would of course have arisen an implication that
the property should be developed reasonably ...." Id. at 436, 18 A. at 339.
16. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). Brewster is referred to as the most cited and quoted
opinion in the area of implied covenants. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13,
at § 802. Modern courts continue to cite it with approval. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981).
17. Brewster, 140 F. at 809.
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The Brewster rationale is based on the court's interpretation of the
intent of the parties." Over the years, however, courts have implied
covenants on other grounds, " including public policy 2" and general prin2
ciples of equity. '

18. The intent theory can be considered a smaller component of the broad duty of
cooperation imposed upon the lessor and lessee. See Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities
Service Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Okla. 1972); 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra
note 13, at § 802.1. Cf. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917). "Without an implied promise, the transaction cannot have such business 'efficacy,
as both parties must have intended that all events it should have."' Id. at 91, 118 N.E.
at 215. See also, Meyers, The Effect of Express Provisions in an Oil and Gas Lease on
Implied Obligations, 14 Inst. Min. L. 90, 90-92.
In applying the marketing covenant, courts have stated that the royalty clause, when
considered in light of the exclusive right to develop held by the lessee, reveals an agreement,
albeit a silent one, that the gas discovered will be marketed. See lams v. Carnegie Natural
Gas, 144 Pa. 72, 72-73, 45 A. 54, 54-55 (1899); Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co., 199
S.W. 686, 689 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1917), rev'd on other grounds, 113 Tex. 212, 254
S.W. 311 (1918). This reasoning is especially valid where, as is most often the case, the
lessor's only long term remuneration is a share of the minerals marketed from the leasehold.
See, e.g., Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F.2d 981, 985 (6th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 634 (1940); Wolf v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425, 432 (10th Cir. 1936).
19. As a general rule, the bases for each of the implied covenants may be the same.
M. Merrill, supra note 13, at 186. See also Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81
Kan. 553, 560, 106 P. 47, 50 (there is little difference between implied drilling covenant
and implied marketing covenant), modified, 83 Kan. 367, 108 P. 813 (1910).
20. This basis has most often been applied to the development and exploration
covenants. See Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979), where
the court, in cancelling a lease for lack of development, noted:
[Alt this particular point in time the public interest in encouraging the prudent
development of oil and gas is particularly important. The development of domestic sources of oil will reduce the amount of oil which has to be imported
and will thereby redound to the national interest by helping to reduce the deficit
trade balance and to render the nation less susceptible to economic dislocations
arising from political disturbances in foreign oil producing nations.
Id. at 1069. See also 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 802.2; Martin, A
Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop and Market Under Mineral
Leases, 27 Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 177, 205 (1976) (author suggesting courts consider
public policy in applying implied covenants). But cf. Weaver, supra note I, at 1492
(author cautions that use of public policy rationale may ignore bargained for expectations
of parties).
21. Accord Martin, supra note 20, at 198. See Darr v. Eldridge, 66 N.M. 260, 263,
346 P.2d 1041, 1044 (1959). Courts which apply the duty to market on equitable principles
reason that such a duty must be implied to protect the lessor from the inequality of
bargaining power and control over marketing that exists between lessor and lessee. See,
e.g., Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 192 Okla. 355, 358, 137 P.2d 940, 943 (1943). Similarly,
equitable principles might be applied to prevent the lessee from speculating at the lessor's
expense. See, e.g., Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F.2d 981, 985 (6th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 634 (1940); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 59 S.W.2d 534,
537 (Ky. 1933); Reynolds v. White Plains Oil & Gas Co., 199 Ky. 243, 246, 250 S.W.
975, 976 (1923).
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Historical Development of the Marketing Covenant2
One of the recognized but little discussed implied covenants relates
to the lessee's duty to market the product discovered on the leasehold.
The marketing covenant applies equally to oil and gas; however, as a
practical matter, it is rarely applied to the production of oil. 23 As with
most implied covenants, the marketing covenant arises even though under
most conditions or circumstances both the lessor and lessee share a
common interest in marketing the minerals discovered. However, where

circumstances occur which make the marketing of the product detrimental
to the lessee's best interest, disputes will arise.2 4 It is because of these

22. While other commentators present variations, the list of implied covenants put
forth by Professor Hemingway is generally accepted.
A. Implied covenants to develop the lease.
1. Drilling an initial well.
2. Developing the lease upon production.
B. Implied covenants of protection.
1. Protecting against drainage.
2. Abstaining from depreciation of the lessor's interest.
C. Implied covenants relating to management and administration of the lease.
1. Produce and market.
2. Operate with reasonable care.
3. Use of modern methods of producton and development.
4. Seek favorable administrative action.
R. Hemingway, supra note 13, at 411. See also M. Merrill, supra note 13, at 23; Walker,
supra note 12, at 401; 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 804 (each setting
out similar list of implied covenants).
23. Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 63, 41 S.W.2d
414, 416 (1931); Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee With Respect to Sale of Gas and
As To Gas Royalty Provisions, 4 Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 181, 182 (1953). "Oil is
of such a nature that it need not be transported to a market through a pipeline, but
may be taken from the ground and stored in tanks to await shipment by rail or truck
to an ever-ready market." 2 W. Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas, 222-23 (1959). See
also 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 853 (stating reasons why duty to
market generally applies to gas wells).
24. Donahoe, Implied Covenants In Oil and Gas Leases and Conservation Practice,
33 Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 97 (1982). "The relationship between lessor and lessee
• . . is a complex one of mutual interest mingled with antagonism." Id. at 98. Consider
the following areas where the lessor's and lessee's interests may not be aligned:
I. There may be no available market, thus the lessee has little incentive to
attempt to find a market.
2. The lessee, a user of gas, may want to hold a lease so as to guarantee a
continued long term supply.
3. The lessee may be financially unable to construct facilities necessary to
market the product.
4. The lessee may feel that, given the present market, the steps necessary to
market the product are not economically feasible.
5. The lessee may desire to drill a deeper well in search of more marketable
gas, or, in the alternative, oil.
6. The lessee may be satisfied with a profitable contract and, despite the lessor's
urging, fail to seek a more favorable contract.
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potentially conflicting situations that the implied covenant to market
was developed.
The basic principles underlying the implied covenant to market were
elucidated in 1899 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas.25 The case also is illustrative of the early marketing
covenant cases which dealt not with a fractional royalty but with a flat
rate sum to be paid if gas was found and marketed. The basic problems
that have confronted all courts dealing with the marketing covenant are
reflected in Iams. For example, the court had to determine the standard
of conduct to govern the lessee's activities under the lease.2 6 It concluded
that once the marketing duty was triggered by the finding of gas in
sufficient quantities "[tihe tenant [lessee] was then under an obligation
27
to operate for the common good of both parties."
The Iams court also impliedly discussed the allocation of the burden
of proof on the issue of proving a violation of the marketing covenant.
In this case the plaintiff/lessor presented evidence of the defendant/
lessee's failure to market the gas which had been found in quantities
sufficient to justify marketing. The burden of presenting evidence then
shifted to the lessee to "show some good reason for not having done
S0. ''28 In this case the jury did not accept the lessee's rebuttal testimony
and held for the lessor.2 9
The parameters of the implied covenant were developed more fully
in Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 0 As with lams, the court was
dealing with a fixed sum royalty for gas. However, there was no express
covenant to market the gas if sufficient quantities were found.' The
court nonetheless found that an implied covenant to market existed
based on the implied intent of the parties in agreeing to the lease with
a royalty provision. The marketing covenant springs forth from the
nature of the leasehold transaction whereby the lessor's major benefits
only arise upon the marketing of any discovered mineral.32 The court
25. 194 Pa. 72, 45 A. 54 (1899). This case involved an express covenant to market
gas if it was found in "sufficient quantities." Id. at 72, 45 A. at 54.
26. Id. at 72, 45 A. at 54. See also, Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 31 Kan.
553, 106 P. 47 (1910), McGraw Oil & Gas v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027
(1909).
27. lams v. Carnegie Natural Gas, 194 Pa. 72, 45 A. 54 (1899) (quoting Glasgow
v. Chartiers Oil Co., 152 Pa. 48, 25 A. 232 (1892)).
28. Id. at 75, 45 A. at 55.
29. The remedy in cases involving a flat sum royalty would be a money judgment
for the unpaid sum plus interest. Cancellation should not be available. 5 H. Williams &
C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 853.
30. 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47 (1910).
31. Id. at 557, 106 P. at 48. There was an express covenant to provide the lessee
with gas for domestic purposes if sufficient quantities were found. The lessee.was in
compliance with this free use covenant. Id.

32. See supra note 18.
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did not discuss the relevant standard to judge the lessee's conduct because
there was a total absence of any effort to market the discovered gas.
The court also differed from Jams in the remedy given to the lessor.
Although the case involved a fixed sum royalty, the court concluded
that there was no adequate remedy at law.3 3 Treating the implied covenant as both a condition and a covenant, the court upheld a decree

of forfeiture terminating the leasehold estate.3"
By 1931 the Texas Supreme Court had accepted as a well-established
fact the implied covenant to market in the context of an oil and gas

lease.3 The marketing covenant was derived from and considered an
essential part of the development covenant, as neither the lessor or lessee

gained any advantage from the discovery of hydrocarbons unless those
substances were marketed.1 6 The covenant to market in the oil and gas

lease transaction had its foundation in the earlier hard-rock mineral
cases which implied a covenant to market minerals such as coal or
sulfur.37 The implied covenant to market was soon recognized in most
oil producing jurisdictions throughout the United States."
The Prima Facie Case
The minimum elements that a lessor must prove to state a cause

of action for breach of the implied covenant to market are:
33. 81 Kan. at 561, 106 P. at 50. The court had eventually determined that the gas
was found in sufficient quantities to justify marketing.
34. Id. at 563, 100 P. at 50-51. See infra note 74 for authority to the contrary. In
Howerton, given an absence of drainage to other leases it is difficult to support the
court's conclusion that a money damage recovery for the amount of the unpaid fixed
sum royalty, with interest, would not have adequately compensated the lessor for the
breach of the implied covenant to market.
35. Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d
414 (1931).
36. Id. at 63, 41 S.W.2d at 416. As in Jams the court based its decision on an
express covenant although it repeated on several occasions that the duty to market would
exist outside of any express covenant. Id. at 66, 41 S.W.2d at 416-17.
37. Id. at 66, 41 S.W.2d at 416-17 (citing Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 394, 15 S.W.
396 (1981) (sulfur lease)). In contrast to Jams where money damages were a sufficient
remedy, the court in Cole Petroleum cancelled the lease because a specific leasehold
provision stipulated forfeiture of the assigned estate for any breach of an express or
implied covenant. 121 Tex. at 66, 41 S.W.2d at 417.
38. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1936);
Peoples Gas (to. v. Dean, 193 F. 938, 942 (8th Cir. 1911); Howerton v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 556, 106 P. 47, 49 (1910); Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231
Ky. 284, 288, 21 S.W.2d. 445, 447 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929); Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co.,
148 La. 540, 87 So. 265 (1921); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 442, 28 P.2d
187, 191-92 (1933); Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1923) (writ dism'd); Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 12,
222 P. 570, 572 (1924). See generally W. Summers, supra note 23 at 582-95; 5 H. Williams
& C. Meyers, supra note 13, at §§ 853-858.3; Walker, supra note 12, at 437-41 (each
discussing the marketing covenant).
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1.

Discovery of hydrocarbons on the premises;

2.

Failure to market the discovered hydrocarbons;

3.

Ability to market the hydrocarbons if the lessee's actions
complied with the relevant standard of conduct, and;
Damages proximately caused by the lessee's failure to act
in the prescribed manner. 9

4.

40
Once these requirements have been met, a remedy is available.

The initial requirement that hydrocarbons be discovered on the
premises is axiomatic. Clearly one must have a product to market before

a duty to market will arise. However, as in Iams and Howerton, a
factual issue may arise as to whether
the hydrocarbons have been dis4
covered in "sufficient quantities." '
The second element required to establish a cause of action for breach
of the marketing duty requires the lessor to prove that a market exists.

42
Markets only exist if there is a willing buyer as well as a willing seller.

39. Accord, 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 855; Weaver, supra
note 11,at 1513.
In addition to these traditional elements of the implied covenant to market, recent
cases have dealt with different duties that may arise in today's oil and gas patch. For
example in Texas Oil & Gas Co. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1984), the court
suggests that the lessee owes the lessor the duty to disclose the fact that the sale of gas
is to a subsidary corporation of the lessee who in turn is selling to a third party at a
higher rate. The duty to disclose might arise in the context of a division order or the
contract for sale where self-dealing is involved.
Although it is not mentioned, one could infer from the court's decision in Diamond
Shamrock Corp.- v. Harris, 681 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1984), that where a producer has
committed the reserves in an area to a purchaser and then negotiated a proceeds lease
with a lessor for on-leasehold sales, an implied marketing covenant obligation would arise
so that a subsequent royalty owner could receive market value based royalties in the
absence of disclosure by the lessee that he would be bound to accept the proceeds of
the gas purchase contract previously negotiated. The result can be best explained on a
duty to disclose rationale since there would normally be no requirement that a lessee
disclose prior agreements with third parties to lessors or lessor assignees as was the case
in Harris. If the covenant to market existed when the lease was being negotiated then a
duty to disclose the marketing obligations of the lessee and how they would impact the
royalty clause might be implied and the leasehold terms ignored.
40. Available remedies may include absolute cancellation, conditional cancellation, or
damages. For a general discussion of available remedies see 4 E. Kuntz, Oil and Gas
128-34, (1978); 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at 416.2-416.6. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-32.
41. See infra note 142. This issue may be subsumed in the broad context of the
lessee's standard of conduct. Under no standard would the lessee be required to market
such small quantities of gas as would make marketing impractical or inefficient.
42. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Corp., 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971). The court
concluded there must first be an ."opportunity for selling the commodity ... that is the
existence of a commercial demand for the same."' Id. at 936 (quoting Replogle v. Indian
Territory Illuminating Co., 193 Okla. 361, 366, 143 P.2d 1002, 1007 (1943)).
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Thus, notwithstanding the fact that commercial quantities of oil and

gas have been discovered, there is no breach of the marketing covenant
unless it is shown that an actual market existed. 3 It is clear, however,
that the lessee must undertake diligent efforts to secure a buyer if none
are readily available. 44 Often it is apparent that the lessee has done little
if anything regarding the marketing of the gas.
Although rarely discussed, the rules allocating the burden of proof
and burden of going forward in the context of the marketing duty are
very important. 45 In Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co. the allocation
of the burden to the lessor to prove the existence of a market for the
gas was undoubtedly a critical factor in the Tenth Circuit's reversal of
the trial court's finding that a market existed. 46 In one recent case, a
federal district court held that under Oklahoma law the burden of proof
was on the lessor to show a breach of the marketing covenant. 4 However,
it cited an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision that dealt not with the
implied covenant to market but with the issue of what royalties are
owed under a "market price" royalty clause. 48
In Iams, one of the first marketing covenant cases, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court seemingly shifted the burden of proof to the lessee once
the lessor had proven discovery of hydrocarbons and a total failure to
market. 49 Montana also places the burden on the lessee to establish

43. See Bristol v. Coiorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir. 1944);
Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 358 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Okla. 1960); Morgan v.
Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 84 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1935) (writ
dism'd). In each of these cases the courts found no breach of the duty to market because
no market demand existed. The absence of a market may also exist for other reasons.
For example, the distance from the well to a pipeline willing to accept the product may
be substantial, Bristol, 225 F.2d at 897; there may be insufficient pressure at the wellhead,
McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Okla. 1958); or there
may be impurities in the product, Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101,
104, 3 So. 2d 389, 292-94 (1941). The lease may, however, terminate under the habendum
clause. See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
44. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933, 938 (10th Cir. 1971). The court
stated that even though it appeared that no market existed, the lessee must use "normal
procedures and practices of the existing industry" in attempting to secure a market. Id.
See, e.g., Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47 (1910); Hutchinson
v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La. 540, 87 So. 265 (1921).
45. Professors Williams and Meyers assert that the lack of discussion of burden of
proof issues indicates judicial approval of the usual allocation of the burden to the lessor/
plaintiff. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 856.
46. 435 F.2d 933, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1971). There was conflicting evidence at trial
about the marketability of the gas because of pipeline unavailability, lack of sufficient
revenues and processing plant capacity.
47. Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
48. Id. at 190 (citing Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981)).
49. 194 Pa. 72, 74; 45 A. 54, 55 (1899). The court approved a jury instruction
requiring the lessee to "show some good reason for not [marketingl" once the lessor had
shown that gas was discovered in sufficient quantities.
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reasonable diligence in the marketing of the gas in order to avoid a
decree of cancellation." The burden of going forward may also shift
to the lessee where there are extraordinary circumstances such as a very
lengthy time period between discovery and marketing." Finally, the
burden may shift if the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing
of drainage, especially where the lessee is conducting the drainage op52
erations.
The third element requires a showing that had the lessee complied
with the applicable standard of conduct, the hydrocarbons would have
been marketed. Thus the lessor must prove, even in the absence of any
marketing activity, that had the lessee attempted to market he would
have succeeded." For the modern cases involving not a total lack of
marketing but a lack of effective or competent marketing, the lessor
54
must show that a better deal could have been made.
Finally, the lessor must prove that he has been damaged by the breach
of the marketing covenant. In the older cases involving a fixed sum royalty, the lessor could not state a cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant to market if the lessee had paid or tendered the fixed sum."
An illustrative case showing the burden of proof necessary to sustain
an action for damages is Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 1 in which
the court found that statistical and geological certainty were not required. 7 The result was simplified by the lessor's ability to show loss
of hydrocarbons by drainage to adjacent leaseholds. This allowed the
court to grant the lessor lost royalties as the proper measure of damages.5"

50. Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 532, 63 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1936); Berthelote
v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187 (1933).
51. Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1944). The tenth
circuit concluded that "[nine and one-half years] is inordinately long and undoubtedly
places the burden upon the lessees to excuse the delay." Id. at 897.
52. See, e.g., Dixon v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Okla. 1972);
Haken v. Harper Oil Co., 600 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).
53. Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 287, 21 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1929).
5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 855. A different rule should apply in
cases where the lack of marketing effects the habendum clause, and not the marketing
covenant. See text accompanying infra notes 75 to 85.
54. See, e.g., Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961).
55. Hurst v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 221 Ky. 786, 299 S.W. 954 (1927); McGraw
Oil & Gas Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W.Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027 (1909).
56. 231 Ky. 284, 21 S.W.2d 445 (1929).
57. Id. at 291, 21 S.W.2d at 448-49. Plaintiff was able to show the amount of
potential daily gross and net production as well as the price of similar gas in the area.
He was also able to prove the loss of some of that gas through drainage.
58. Id. at 292, 21 S.W.2d at 448-49. The lessor had also sought and received the
remedy of cancellation so that he was not able to recover damages for the gas still in
the ground. Id. A recovery. of interest on the unpaid royalty, had the gas been properly
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The burden of proof of the damage element of the cause of action is
clearly on the plaintiff.5 9

IlI. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT THE DUTY TO MARKET
The implied covenant to market, unlike most of the other implied
covenants, arises under a variety of circumstances. This has had an
impact on the way courts view and analyze the component parts of
the covenant. Circumstances such as the relation of marketing to the
obligations under the habendum clause, the existence or non-existence
of a shut-in gas royalty clause, and the problem with constantly
changing regulated or unregulated markets for natural gas all create
6
some difficult conceptual issues for the courts to resolve. 0
Expiration of the Lease Under the Habendum Clause
The typical oil and gas lease provides that the lease shall extend
throughout the primary term "and so long thereafter as oil or gas or
other hydrocarbon substances are produced in paying quantities." ' 6 Thus
it is clear that the lease may terminate by its own terms if there is no
actual production in paying quantities on or before the final day of the
primary term. 62 However, because of the various meanings given the
word "produced," this is not always the case. A dichotomy is found
in the construction of the term "produced" which creates substantial
confusion in discerning between cancellation for breach of the implied
covenant to market and termination of the lease under the habendum
clause for failure to produce in paying quantities. 63 The dichotomy, and
its affect on the marketing covenant, is best exemplified by the differing
views taken by two major producing states-Texas and Oklahoma.

marketed, still might have been appropriate.
59.

Id.

60. See infra text accompanying notes 193-98. These circumstances are in addition
to the normal difficulties of proof that accompany an allegation that a lessee has breached
the marketing covenant. Problems relating to existence or non-existence of gathering lines,
processing plants and potential markets are all an "intrinsic" part of the cause of action.
61. See, e.g., the lease form at 7 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at §
699.1. The requirements of "paying quantities" exists absent express statement. Stewart
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 161
Tex. 51, 54, 337 S.W.2d 267, 269 (1960).
62. See, e.g., Reid, 161 Tex. at 54-55, 337 S.W.2d at 269-70. Various "savings"
clauses could extend the life of the lease into the secondary term without production.
See generally, R. Hemingway, supra, note 13, at § 853.4.
63. See 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at 394. See also Reid, 161 Tex.
at 54, 337 S.W.2d at 269. "An oil and gas lease . . . [creates] a determinable fee in the
land which terminates upon the happening of the events upon which it is limited."
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The Texas View - Production in Paying Quantities Requires
Discovery and Marketing of Commercial Quantities After the End of
the Primary Term
It is well established in Texas law that the devotion of the leased
premises to the exploration, development, and production of minerals
creates a special limitation on the lessee's estate. 64 Thus, absent a savings
clause of some type, 61 a lease terminates at the end of the primary term66
if minerals are not being produced and marketed in paying quantities.
The Texas view is exemplified by Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid. 67 In Reid the
parties executed a mineral lease containing a five year primary term on
December 9, 1943. The lessee began drilling a well a few days prior to
the end of the primary term and completed the well on January 18,
1949. At that time the lessee tendered shut-in payments to the lessor.
The payments were refused. The lessee contracted for the sale of the
gas production on June 7, 1949, and gathering lines were connected
some four months later. From that time until the time of trial, gas was
being produced and marketed in paying quantities.', The lessor sued for
cancellation of the lease. In granting the lessor's request the court stated:
[N]o matter how great the potential production may be or how
many million cubic feet of gas may have been flared there would
be no production or production in paying quantities unless there
[T]he fact that there is no available
was an available market ....
market is not an excuse for failure to produce, and the lease
terminates unless some other provision will keep it in force. 69
Therefore, as with fee simple determinables, the leasehold interest
is automatically terminated if the requisite condition is not met. Under
the Texas approach, that condition requires the lessee to both discover
and market the hydrocarbons in order to extend the leasehold estate
into the secondary term.
The Oklahoma View - Discovery of Commercial Quantities
During the Primary Term Temporarily Extends the Lease Into the
Secondary Term
The Oklahoma position was initially proposed by the Tenth Circuit
in Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp.70 In Bristol, a well capable of
64,

Walker, supra note 12, at 408; Reid, 161 Tex. at 54, 337 S.W.2d at 269.

65. Typical clauses which may, notwithstanding the absence of production in paying
quantities, propel the lease into the secondary term are discussed at R. Hemingway, supra
note 13, at 304-334. They include the shut-in royalty clause, the commencement clause,
the dry hole clause, and the continuous operations clause.
66. Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 278, 171 S.W.2d 339, 34142 (1943).
67.
68.
69.
70.

161
Id.
Id.
225

Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
at 53, 337 S.W.2d at 268.
at 55, 337 S.W.2d at 270.
F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955). At the time the tenth circuit decided the Bristol
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producing in paying quantities was completed within the primary term.
However, because of the poor quality of the product and the absence
of pipeline facilities, the well was capped for over seven years beyond
the end of the primary term.7 1 The court, while noting that the rule
may differ in other jurisdictions, stated:

tT]his lease is an Oklahoma contract, and .. . under Oklahoma
law, actual production v° tnin the definite term of the lease is
not a condition precedent to extension of the lease beyond its
definite term . . . . IT]he lessee has a reasonable time to market
the gas after discovery and expiration of the definite term of
the lease."
As the Oklahoma ceurts have solidified their positions, they have
specifically rejected the application of the Texas view that the habendum
clause creates an estate analogous to the common law fee simple determinable estate. 3 The Oklahoma interpretation of the habendum clause
is grounded upon a general statutory provision requiring the courts to
74
avoid forfeiture on equitable principles.
Significance of the Distinction
As can be discerned from the above discussion, the dichotomy centers
around the interpretation of the word "production" as used in the lease.
Clearly, Oklahoma courts view production as not including actual marketing. Rather, the duty to market arises solely from an express or
implied covenant. 75 Texas courts, on the other hand, construe production

case, it had already been rebuffed once in its attempt to interpret habendum clauses as
only requiring discovery and not marketing prior to the end of the primary term. In
interpreting a Kansas lease, the court in Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d
207 (10th Cir. 1948), similarly held that only discovery is required. In Tate v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952) the Kansas Supreme Court disagreed
and maintained the rule requiring both discovery and marketing. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court did not endorse the Bristol approach until 1958 when it decided McVicker v. Horn,
Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958). See infra note 75.
71. Bristol, 225 F. 2d 894, 895 (10th Cir. 1955). Gas was eventually marketed seven
years and nine months after the end of the primary term. This was nine and one-half
years after the successful completion of the well. Id.
72. Id. at 896.
73. Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 858 (Okla. 1979).
74. Okla Stat. tit. 23, § 2 (1981).
75. See Flag Oil Corp. v. King Resources Co., 494 P.2d 322, 325 (Okla. 1972);
Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 358 P.2d 1103, 1106-07 (Okla. 1960); McVicker v.
Horn, Robinson, & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410, 412-14 (Okla. 1958). In McVicker the court
discussed the meaning of "production" as used in Oklahoma oil and gas leases. To say
that marketing during the primary term of the lease is essential to its extension
beyond said term, unless the lease contains additional provisions indicating a
contrary intent, is to not only ignore the distinction between producing and
marketing ... but it also ignores the difference between express and implied
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as not merely requiring a duty to market, but the reality of a sale of
the discovered hydrocarbons.7 6 Thus, in Oklahoma and the states following its interpretation, the habendum clause is satisfied by discovery
and diligent efforts to market hydrocarbons from the property." The
view followed by Texas and other states, however, requires actual pro78
duction (including marketing) in paying quantities.
There are two categories of marketing covenant cases; one dealing
with a total absence of marketing and the second dealing with the
second-guessing of a consummated marketing transaction. In Texas-type
jurisdictions the first category of suits would be impossible unless there
was a shut-in royalty or other savings clause in the lease. 79 The secondcategory of litigation can occur as long as marketing in paying quantities
80
is carried on.
On the other hand, in Oklahoma-type jurisdictions total failure to
market suits can be brought in either the primary or secondary term
regardless of the inclusion of a shut-in gas royalty provision.8 ' However,

terms in lease contracts.
McVicker, 322 P.2d at 413. Accord Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla.
1979); Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Okla. 1978).
76. This interpretation was plainly stated in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill,
107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1937) (writ ref'd). In that case the lessee shut
in a well capable of producing seven million cubic feet per day. However, the court noted
that the lease "did not provide that it should remain in force and effect for five years,
and as long thereafter as there may be prospects of a market for the product .
I..."
Id.
at 749. Accord Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323, 327-29 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1944)
(writ ref'd).
77. Principal support for the Oklahoma view is found in Montana, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. See, e.g., Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp., 129 Mont. 300, 321, 285 P.2d 578,
587-88 (1955); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, 84 W. Va. 67, 76-77, 99 S.E. 274, 278
(1919); Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 17, 222 P. 570, 573 (1924).
78. The Oklahoma view has been rejected by most producing states. See, e.g., Tate
v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952). "[A]n habendum clause
... requires actual production during the primary term as distinct from mere exploration
or discovery." Id. at 354-55, 240 P.2d at 468. Accord Landry v. Flaitz, 245 La. 223,
232-22, 157 So. 2d 892, 895 (1963); Jones Land Grant, Inc. v. Ringle Dev. Co., 56 N.M.
101, 106, 240 P.2d 850, 853 (1952).
79. See, e.g., Landry, 245 La. at 238, 152 So.2d at 895-97. In Landry the court
declared the lease terminated "by its term[s]" for failure of the lessees to establish actual
production in paying quantities before the final day of the primary term. Id. The lease
may be kept alive, however, by meeting the requirements of other leasehold savings
provisions or by having another producing well located on the leasehold premises.
80. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co, 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979), aff'd
per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tx. 1980).
81. See Christian, 506 P.2d at 1347. "After the mineral is discovered the lessee is
required to use reasonable diligence ... [in] marketing the product within a reasonable
time. Failure to do so will result in termination of the lease under the habendum clause

after the expiration of the primary term." Accord Bristol, 225 F.2d at 897.
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because of the almost universal inclusion of shut-in gas royalty provisions
in many widely used lease forms in all states, 8 2 the distinction may be
illusory. An issue that remains to be resolved is whether the duty to
market should differ depending on whether the alleged breach occurs
while the lessor is receiving shut-in royalty payments.8 3 A related issue
concerns the impact that the potential remedy has on the duty to market.
In Oklahoma-type jurisdictions, breach of the marketing covenant in
the secondary term will cause a termination of the lease because the
habendum clause has been violated. 84 In Texas-type jurisdictions, breaches
may lead to termination but in certain circumstances can be limited to
85
only a recovery of monetary damages.
Effect of Shut-In Royalty Provisions In the Lease
The effect of shut-in royalty provisions on the implied covenant to
market is an actual but as yet unanswered issue affecting the marketing
covenant in the secondary term. Where a lessee completes a gas well
capable of producing in paying quantities but is unable to achieve actual
production because of the absence of a market, the lease may be
preserved beyond the primary term by payment of shut-in royalties
pursuant to an appropriate leasehold provision. Again, however, a distinction must be made between the states which interpret "production"
to include the duty to market (the Texas view) and those which hold
that commercial discovery is equivalent to 'production (the Oklahoma
view).
In states following the Texas view, the timely payment of shut-in
royalties serves an independent and distinct purpose-extension of the
lease to the secondary term in the absence of actual production. Such
a savings clause is necessary because, as was noted previously, 6 the fact

82. The 1981 American Association Petroleum Landmen approved model lease forms
for Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas all include shut-in gas royalty
provisions.
83. No Oklahoma decision has terminated a lease for failure to market gas in the
secondary term but dictum in Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 858 (Okla.
1979) supports the proposition that if the lessee breached his duty and could not raise
other equitable considerations, a decree of cancellation would be proper. Failure to do
so will result in termination of the lease under the habendum clause after the expiration
of the primary term. Accord Bristol, 225 F.2d at 897.
84. Damages may be the sole remedy available if the lease does not have specific
forfeiture provisions. Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59,
41 S.W.2d 414 (1931); Guleke v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
85. See Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 278-79, 171 S.W.2d 339,
341-42; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1937) (writ ref'd).
86. See text accompanying supra notes 64 to 69.
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that there is no available market does not excuse the failure to produce.
In order to keep the lease alive in such a situation a savings clause is
8 7
necessary. The shut-in royalty clause is such a provision.
There is a paucity of cases dealing directly with the issue of the
relationship between the shut-in royalty clauses and the implied covenant
to market. There is clearly no case which stands for the proposition
that the existence of such a shut-in clause would preclude the existence
of an implied covenant to market during the secondary term of a lease. 8s
This position is consistent with the view that the purpose of the shutin clause is to act as a general savings provision which propels a lease
into the secondary term where actual marketing of the gas is unachievable
at the end of the primary term.8 9 The interaction of the shut-in royalty
clause and the implied covenant to market has created some confusion,
a confusion which is exacerbated when the habendum clause issue is
added to the mixture. A series of Louisiana cases, for example, reflect
the court's inability to sort out the related but distinct problems of how
the payment of shut-in royalties effects the lessee's obligation to market
gas in either the primary or secondary term of the leasehold estate.
In Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.,90 the Louisiana Supreme
Court was faced with a lessor's argument that the lessee should be
forced to forfeit the leasehold estate for shutting in a well capable of
producing marketable quantities of gas. The lease had provided for the
payment of shut-in royalties, and those payments had been tendered by
the lessee but refused by the lessor. The primary term of the lease had
not expired. Without clearly identifying that there was an implied covenant to market, the court discussed at some length the obligation of
a lessee to market gas from wells which are shut-in and for which the
lessee is already receiving shut-in gas royalties. 9 ' Unless a duty to find
a market existed, notwithstanding an express obligation to keep the lease

87. See Reid, 161 Tex. at 56, 337 S.W.2d at 271. "The provision in the lease for
payment of 'shut-in' royalty is to provide for just that eventuality, namely, where gas
has been discovered in paying quantities, but a market is lacking." States following the
Texas view include: Kansas, Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 252, 187
P. 692, 694 (1920); Louisiana, Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 746, 138 So. 2d 558, 562
(1962); and New Mexico, Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245, 250, 479 P.2d 294, 298-99
(1970). See generally 4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 8-12 (discussing both Texas and
Oklahoma views); 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at §§ 853-855.
88. See generally 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 858.1. But cf.
Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 116-19.
89. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 854.
90. 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941).
91. Id. at 110-13, 3 So. 2d at 292-93. The facts showed that the well was shut-in
because of a high salt water content which would have required additional processing
prior to entry into a nearby pipeline. Id. at 106-08, 3 So. 2d at 191-92.
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alive merely by the payment of $200 per annum, the court's discussion
was unnecessary. The court also concluded that the lessee must engage
in reasonable efforts to actually market the gas and pay the agreedupon royalty based upon the price or market value of the gas so
marketed.92 Although the court never clearly identified this duty as being
based on an implied covenant to market Which was not effected by the
express covenant to pay shut-in royalties, that rationale is the one most
often attributed to the holding in Risinger.93
After a twenty-year hiatus, the Louisiana Supreme Court was again
confronted with an implied covenant to market allegation. Again, however, the court did not clearly identify it as a separate covenant. The
court continued to submerge the marketing obligation into either the
development or good faith operations covenants. In Lelong v. Richardson, 94 the lessor sought a decree of cancellation of a lease upon which
the lessee had drilled two gas wells, both of which had been shut-in.
The primary term of the lease had expired, but the lessee had tendered
to the lessor the shut-in royalties which were provided for in the lease.'
The court's opinion is somewhat perplexing because it merges the implied

marketing and development covenants. 96 The decision clearly follows the
Risinger rationale-that the payment of shut-in royalties does not ex-

tinguish the lessee's duty to continue to seek a market for the discovered
natural gas. The fact that the lease was in the secondary term was not

relevant to the marketing obligation because it was being kept alive by
the shut-in payments.
However, the court then cites with approval the two Tenth Circuit
97

cases which espouse the Oklahoma-type definition of a habendum clause,

even though Louisiana is generally thought of as a Texas-type jurisdiction
requiring actual or constructive production at the end of the primary

92. The lessee conceded that they could not pay the $200 royalty indefinitely without
making reasonable and diligent efforts to market the product. Id. at 110, 3 So. 2d at
292.
Unless the court perceived that there was a continuing duty to exercise diligent efforts
notwithstanding the payment of the royalty due there was no need to discuss the efforts
of the lessee to find a market. Id. at 106-12, 3 So. 2d at 291-93.
93. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at 421. The court also noted that
failing to make a proper payment would not terminate the lease, while also noting that
failing to meet the duty to market would support at least a conditional cancellation or
forfeiture of the lease. 198 La. at 105, 116, 3 So. 2d at 291, 294.
94. 126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 821-22.
96. 1d. at 829. The court at one point said the issue is whether or not the payment
of shut-in royalties keeps the lease alive in the secondary term but then in the next
paragraph returns to the issue of the lessee's duty to adequately develop the leasehold as
being a determinative question that must be answered. Id. at 830.
97. Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948); Bristol
Y. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp.. 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
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term in order for the leasehold estate to continue into the secondary

term. 98 Notwithstanding the unexplained adherence to the Bristol rationale, the court concluded, again by inference, that payment of shut-

in royalties will not hold a lease forever, even though the terms of the
lease might be so interpreted. As with the Risinger opinion, the court

imposes on the lessee a duty to seek a market for the shut-in gas. In
doing so, however, the court raises the spectre of a potential conflict
between the habendum and covenant obligations by imposing some type
of absolute time-limit before which the lease will be cancelled notwith-

standing the payment of shut-in royalties. 99 Under a pure covenant
analysis requiring the lessee to exercise due diligence, one could posit
a set of circumstances where no market could exist for a lengthy period
of time and the lessee would not have breached his obligations under
a marketing covenant. But under the court's language in Lelong, the
combination of habendum and shut-in royalty clauses might require
actual marketing within a reasonable time after discovery even if mar-

keting is actually impossible.' °0
Finally, in Davis v. Laster, 0' the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed
the good faith efforts of the lessee to market the shut-in gas during
the secondary term, notwithstanding the fact that the shut-in royalties
had been paid to the lessor. 0 2 If the implied covenant to market did

not continue to impose a duty upon the lessee after the payment of
shut-in royalties, the court would not have needed to discuss, at some
length, the actual attempts at marketing and development which the
lessee had engaged in. 03
Although one might expect a different treatment of the shut-in

royalty clause problem in Oklahoma-type jurisdictions, such has not

98.

Lelong, 126 So. 2d at 826-29 (citing Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-

in Gas Royalty Provisions in Oil and Gas Leases, 23 Tul. L. Rev. 374 (1949)), for the
proposition that discovery and marketing is required to propel a lease into the secondary

term in the absence of a shut-in royalty clause. Lelong, 126 So. 2d at 826-27. See also,
Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
99. Lelong, 126 So. 2d at 828. The court also suggests that the length of time that
is determined to be reasonable may depend upon the amount that is being paid to the
lessor under the shut-in royalty clause. If the shut-in clause and the implied covenant to
market are treated independently the amount paid is irrelevant to answering the question
of whether the lessee had acted reasonably and diligently in his search for a market for
the shut-in gas.
100. Id. at 828-29. See also Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-In Gas Royalty
Provisions in Oil and Gas Leases: Part 11, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 478 (1953).
101. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
102. Id. at 754, 138 So.2d at 564. The court also more clearly adopted a Texas-type
approach to the issue of applying the habendum clause, Id. at 757-58, 138 So. 2d at
565, throwing into some doubt the Lelong court's approval of the Bristol and Christianson
holdings.
103. Id. at 739, 757, 138 So. 2d at 559-60, 565.
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been the case. Gard v. Kaiser"' is representative of the Oklahoma view
of shut-in royalty payments. In that case the lessor brought an action
for cancellation of the lease on the ground that the lessee failed to pay
shut-in royalties after expiration of the primary term. Gas had previously
been marketed from the lease but marketing had temporarily ceased. 05
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, after stating that in Oklahoma immediate
marketing is not required to satisfy the habendum clause, noted that a
shut-in royalty clause is not necessary to extend the lease beyond the
primary term once a commercial well has been completed. Rather, the
lease is extended with or without payment of shut-in royalties but is
subject to forfeiture for breach of the marketing covenant.' °6 Even in
states following the Oklahoma view, however, leases which provide for
payment of shut-in royalties can stipulate that payment will not hold
the lease open beyond a specified date. 07
The question still remains: What effect does the acceptance of shutin royalty payments have on the implied covenant to market? In states
following the Texas view, it would appear that the acceptance of shutin royalty payments does not extinguish the duty to market. However,
this issue has only been directly addressed by one court. In Pray v.
Premier Petroleum, Inc.,' °8 the Kansas Supreme Court stated that "the
fact [that] the lease is held by payment of shut-in gas royalties does
not excuse the lessee from his duty to diligently search for a market
and to otherwise conduct himself as a reasonable and prudent lessee
....1)109 This position is supported by the commentators. 0

104. 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978).
105. Id. at 1312. Marketing had ceased for a period of three years for lack of adequate
wellhead pressure. In the interim the lessee had applied for, and eventually received, a
release of the gas sales contract from the Federal Power Commission. A new contract
was negotiated and marketing was resumed after the addition of a compressor.
106. That is, the lessee must act with diligence in seeking a market. Id. at 1313 (citing
4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 9).
107. For a lesson on how not to draft such a provision see Flag Oil Corp. v. King
Resources Co., 494 P.2d 322 (Okla. 1972). For a discussion of why shut-in clauses should
still be inserted in leases executed in states following the Oklahoma view see Discussion
Notes, 41 Oil & Gas Rep. 553 (1972). See also Moses, supra note 100 at 482 (noting the
Louisiana practice of placing a five year limit on shut-in royalty payments).
108. 233 Kan. 351, 662 P.2d 255 (1983).
109. Id. at 354, 662 P.2d at 258. Kansas is a Texas view state. See Elliott v. Crystal
Springs Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 252, 187 P. 692, 694 (1920).
110. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 858. Masterson has a similar
view. "A complete answer to the argument that a shut-in clause is unfair to the lessor
because it would allow the lessee to hold a lease forever without producing is that the
lessee owes a duty to be diligent in searching for a market." Masterson, The Shut-In
Royalty Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 4 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 315, 330 (1958).
Cf. Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941); Lelong
v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (supporting by implication the
above stated commentators).
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The Louisiana approach makes it even clearer that the duty to
market continues into the secondary term along with the payment of
shut-in gas royalties."' The approach taken, which includes in the reasonableness and diligence formula the amount and duration of the royalty
payments, properly balances the interests of the lessor and the lessee."12

It removes much of the incentive of the lessee to delay marketing for
speculative purposes because the time limit will decrease or increase
depending on the size of his out-of-pocket expenses. The one problem
that remains unsolved is that delay in marketing the discovered gas may

often inure to the lessor and lessee's benefit (as well as the public's)
depending on the extant market for gas."3
Although the evidence is contradictory, it would appear that states

following the Oklahoma view would also hold that the acceptance of
shut-in payments does not effect the implied duty to market. In Gard
v. Kaiser,I Ithe Oklahoma Supreme Court, quoting Professor Kuntz,

stated the Oklahoma rule. The court noted that "[t]he lease is extended
with or without the shut-in gas royalty clause, subject to forfeiture for
failure to comply with the implied obligation to market the product.""I5
This statement, however, contradicts an earlier decision by the same
court. In Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.," 6 the court stated
that "it is clear that the lessors may waive their right to demand
production or marketing by accepting delay rentals during the primary
term of the lease . . . ."I" Thus, the three year period for which the
lessors in Gazin accepted delay rentals were not considered in determining
whether marketing had ceased for an unreasonable length of time." 8 As
Williams and Meyers suggest, if acceptance of delay rentals circumvents

111. See supra text accompanying notes 90-103.
112. But cf., Martin, supra note, 20 at 205-07, where the author suggests that public
policy, if included in the implied covenant formula, might favor later rather than earlier
marketing.
113. Martin, supra note 20.
114. 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978).
115. Id. at 1313 (citing 4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 9)(emphasis added). The court
later stated that "shut-in gas provisions are not to be construed as limitations or conditions
which would affect termination of the leases." Gard, 582 P.2d at 1314-15.
116. 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961).
117. Id. at 1011-12. In Gazin the lessee, in October of 1956, completed a well capable
of producing twenty million cubic feet of gas per day. A contract was offered in which
the purchaser would pay ten cents per thousand cubic feet of gas "as and when needed."
Id. at 1011. A more favorable contract, calling for fifteen cents per thousand cubic feet,
with the purchaser obligated to "take or pay" for five percent of the established reserves,
was entered into in April of 1960. In the interim, the lessee, at considerable expense,
had acquired some surrounding acreage and built up reserves. Id.at 1012-13.
118.

Id.at 1012.
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enforcement of the implied covenant to market, perhaps the same could
be said of acceptance of shut-in royalties." 9
Because of the paucity of cases, the impact of shut-in royalty payments on the implied marketing covenant will continue to be a matter
of academic debate and speculation.'2 0 The better view is that acceptance
of shut-in royalty payments should not totally extinguish the lessee's
duty to market. However, the authors suggest that there might be some
good reasons for treating Texas and Oklahoma type jurisdictions differently. In Texas-type jurisdictions payment of shut-in royalties in the
secondary term is mandatory if the lease is to be kept alive. The payment
should be treated solely as a means of satisfying the habendum clause
requirement. As noted earlier, however, the amount and duration of
the payments should be included in determining the reasonableness of
the lessee's actions in order to avoid delays prompted by market speculation.
In Oklahoma-type jurisdictions, however, payment. of shut-in royalties is not needed to satisfy the habendum clause requirements which
propel the lease into the secondary term. Therefore the lessee is paying
the lessor a royalty which, unless tied to the marketing covenant, has
no function. Thus, payment of such a royalty should be treated as an
express covenant relating to the marketing of gas. However, the mere
existence of a shut-in royalty provision should not ipso facto extinguish
the implied covenant to market. It should at least place a heavier burden
on the lessor to show that the lessee is failing to market the gas for

119. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 858.2 n.4.
120. See, e.g., 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 854; Martin, supra
note 20; Weaver, supra note II. Consider Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d
894 (10th Cir. 1955). In that case the lessee was unable to market the gas for over seven
years beyond the end of the primary term. Bristol, one of several lessors, accepted shutin payments until the year before a pipeline connection was made. However, unlike his
co-lessors, Bristol had not signed a shut-in agreement. Id. at 895. Bristol brought suit
for cancellation, alleging that the lessee had breached the implied marketing covenant. In
denying the cancellation of the lease, the court stated:
[Wihile the acceptance of these payments without signing the shut-in agreements
may not operate strictly as an estoppel or waiver of their rights to insist upon
a breach, it is proper, we think, to consider it in the light of all of the other
facts and circumstances in the determination of the ultimate question of prudent
operation in the light of time and effort.
Id. at 898 (emphasis added). Did acceptance of the shut-in royalties "not operate strictly
as an estoppel" because there was no executed agreement, or was the court making a
general statement that acceptance of shut-in payments, even if pursuant to an executed
agreement, can never preclude implication of the marketing covenant?
But see supra note 107. It is likely that many of the lease forms in Oklahoma will
retain a shut-in royalty clause. For example, the three American Association of Petroleum
Landmen oil and gas lease forms in use in 1981 all contained a shut-in gas royalty
provision.
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speculative purposes only. Absent conditions showing substantially unequal bargaining positions, fraud, or coercion, the payment of shut-in
royalties in Oklahoma-type jurisdictions should give the lessee greater
freedom to delay the marketing of the gas.
Presence of Express Lease Clauses
As noted previously,1 2' there is a noticeable absence of express
provisions in oil and gas leases. However, as with other implied covenants, the parties to a lease may agree to certain express provisions
which are inconsistent with, and thereby alter, the duty to market. 22
The strength of this principle was tested in Gex v. Texas Co.'23 In Gex
the lessor alleged that the lessee sold the gas derived from the leased
premises at well below the then existing market price. The lease in
question contained a provision that the lessee "shall never be under
obligation to drill or mine for oil or gas or other minerals, but that
such mining or drilling, both before and after production, shall be
wholly at the option of said grantee.' 24 The court noted that because
a duty to market is implied from the express duty to develop and
produce, the parties had, "by eliminating any implied covenant or
obligation to develop and produce, preclude[d] any implied covenant to
market." 2
A similar principle was enunciated by the tenth circuit in Brimmer
v. Union Oil Co. of California, 26 wherein the court stated that "lain
express covenant upon i given subject, deliberately entered into without
fraud or mutual mistake, excludes the possibility of an implied covenant
of a different or contradictory nature."' 27 Therefore, it is clear that by
executing an express agreement which addresses the lessee's duty to

121. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
122. For a general discussion of the effect express provisions have on the implied
duty to market see 4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 123-25; 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers,
supra note 13, at §§ 857-858.3. The effect express lease clauses have on the implied
covenants is dealt with by statute in Louisiana. See La. R.S. 31:122 (1975). "Parties may
stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on part of the lessee." Id.
123. 337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1960) (writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Id. at 822. The court found that a subsequent amendment to the original lease
was not controlling to the issue. Id.
125. Id. at 825-26. The Gex decision has been soundly criticized by the commentators.
See, e.g., 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 858.3.
126. 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936).
127. Brimmer, 31 F.2d at 440. In Brimmer the parties agreed that the lessee would
build a pipeline when production of five thousand barrels per day could be sold at a
minimum price of one dollar per barrel. The plaintiff sued for breach of the marketing
covenant, alleging that, although the full five thousand barrels could not be sold at one
dollar or more each, the price was such. that a profit could be made by the lessee. Id.
at 440.
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market, the parties may alter the standard of conduct by which the
lessee is to be judged.'
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CONDUCT

Development of a Standard of Conduct

Once it has been determined that an implied covenant applies to a
given lease in a specified situation, the question arises as to what standard
of conduct the lessee's actions are to be judged by. In order to establish

a cause of action for breach of any implied covenant, the lessor must
prove that the lessee has breached the applicable standard. 2 9 Over the
years, courts have
employed various standards of conduct to review
1 30

lessee's conduct.
Early courts accepted the view that a lessee who acted in good faith
could not be guilty of breaching the implied covenants.", In Young v.
Forest Oil Co., 3 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in deciding whether
to order the cancellation of a lease on which the lessee had expended

substantial amounts of money, stated that a lessee is entitled to follow
his "judgment." If that is exercised in good faith, a different opinion
by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or all combined, is of "no
consequence" and will, therefore, not support the forfeiture of the
lease.' Subsequent courts, however, began to move away from the good
faith standard and gravitate towards a more objective test of the lessee's
conduct. Courts which began this trend often seemed to apply both an
objective and subjective standard; 3 4 however, the objective standard has

128. As parties to oil and gas leases become more sophisticated more express clauses
may be included so as to effect the implied covenant to market. Such clauses could deal
with issues relating to federal or state regulatory matters, the acceptable price and terms
in a gas purchase contract, processing plants, or pipeline construction. The large number
of reported opinions dealing with the various implied covenants, however, probably illustrates the difficulty of adding express covenants to leases which have traditionally
eschewed such detail. See supra note 12.
129. See supra note 39.
130. See generally 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 807 (discussing
various standards of conduct).
131. See, e.g., Kellar v. Craig, 126 F. 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1903); Young v. Forest Oil
Co., 194 Pa. 243, 250, 45 A. 121, 122 (1899).
132. 194 Pa. 243, 45 A. 121 (1899).
133. Id. at 250, 45 A. at 122. Accord Kellar, 126 F. at 633. In Kellar the court stated
that "the lessee or his assigns are permitted to determine the character of the work to
be done, and such ascertainment ... , in the absence of fraud, disposes of the question."
134. See, e.g., Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, 164 Ind. 526, 532, 73 N.E. 1084, 1086
(1905) (requiring lessee to act "in good faith upon sound business principles"); Grass v.
Big Creek Dev. Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 725-26, 84 S.E. 750, 753-54 (1915) (seemingly
proposing conflicting tests).
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now become the one by which the lessees are judged. This standard
was articulated in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.'
The object of the operations being to obtain a benefit or profit
for both lessor and lessee, it seems obvious, in the absence of
some stipulation to that effect, that neither is made the arbiter
of the extent to which or the diligence with which the operator
shall proceed, and both are bound by the standard of what is
reasonable .... There can, therefore, be a breach of the covenant for exercise of reasonable diligence, though the lessee not
be guilty of fraud or bad faith .... Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary
36
prudence is what is required.
This standard is known as the reasonably prudent operator standard,
and has been accepted by modern courts as "an essential part of every
37
implied covenant.'
Application of the Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard to the
Implied Marketing Covenant
Although courts often use language which implies the application
of a good faith standard,' 38 modern courts, in reviewing the lessee's
marketing efforts, have generally applied the reasonably prudent operator
standard. 3 9 Absent an express agreement altering the marketing duty, 41
neither the lessee nor the lessor determine the duties owed under the
marketing covenant. 4' Instead, the decision turns on the facts, circumstances, and practical considerations presented in each case. 42 Therefore,
the lessee in any given case is compared to a hypothetical reasonable
person engaged in oil and gas operations. Under such an objective

135. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
136. Id. at 814. The Brewster court expressly rejected the good faith test. Id. at 813.
137. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981).
138. See, e.g., Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
"In determining whether the lease has been forfeited for breach of the covenant to market,
equity 'will impose a rigid standard of good faith on part of the lessee', measured in
each case not only by the lapse of time but the diligence of the operator as well." Id.
at 897 (quoting Phillips Petroleum v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954)); Waechter
v. Amoco Prod. Co. 217 Kan. 489, 510, 537 P.2d 228, 248 (1975).
139. See, e.g., Sword v. Rains, 575 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1978); Nordan-Lawton
Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller, 276 F. Supp. 16, 18 (W.D. La. 1967); Eggleson v.
McCasland, 98 F. Supp. 693, 695 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
140. See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
141. Brewster, 140 F. at 814.
142. Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir. 1955). Accord
Spiller v. Massey & Moore, 406 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Okla. 1965); Clifton v. Koontz, 160
Tex. 82, 89, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1959).
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standard, the lessee cannot justify his wrongful act or omission on the
grounds that his course of action was reasonable based on circumstances

peculiar to himself.'43 Rather, the lessee's marketing activities are compared to those that would have been carried on by a reasonably prudent
operator under similar circumstances.'" Where it is found that the lessee

failed to meet this standard of conduct
he will be liable for breach of
4
the implied marketing covenant.' '

THE VIABILITY OF THE REASONABLY PRUDENT OPERATOR STANDARD
APPLIED TO THE IMPLIED MARKETING COVENANT

AS

As the implied marketing covenant approaches its one hundredth
year of existence, it has, according to some commentators, begun to
show its age. '" Accordingly, a debate has arisen as to the proper standard
of conduct by which a lessee's marketing activities should be judged.
Given the expected increase in the number of lawsuits seeking cancellation
for breach of the implied marketing covenant,' this debate takes on
added importance. This section will consider the current practice of using
the reasonably prudent operator standard to judge a lessee's marketing
activities.
The Setting for the Debate
A review of the litigation based on the implied marketing covenant
reveals that the controversy generally arises in one of two situations.
Historically, marketing covenant cases have arisen when the diligence
of the lessee in obtaining a first purchaser has been questioned by the
lessor. That is, whether the lessee has been timely in obtaining a market. '"
In such a situation the central issue to be decided, assuming damages

143. Accord 2 W. Summers, supra note 23, at 589-92; 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers,
supra note 13, at § 806.3.
144. Bristol, 225 F.2d 897; Peoples Gas Co. v. Dean, 193 F. 938, 942 (8th Cir. 1911);
Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 355, 662 P.2d 255, 258 (1983); Carroll
Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 287, 21 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929);
Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 449, 28 P.2d 187, 191-92 (1933); Masterson
v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1923) (writ dism'd);
Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross., 31 Wyo. 9, 106, 222 P. 570 (1924).
145. For a discussion of the remedies available for breach of the marketing covenant
see infra text accompanying notes 214-32. See also 4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 12834; 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 857.
146. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 20, at 190-93, 188-205; 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers,
supra note 13, at § 856.3. But see Weaver, supra note 11, at 1515-19 (rebutting the
arguments made by the above cited authors).
147. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir.
1955); Christianson v. Champlin Ref. Co., 169 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1948); McVicker
v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410, 413 (Okla. 1958).
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and an available market, is whether the lessee has breached the applicable
49
standard of conduct.
The second setting under which marketing covenant cases may arise
is when the lessor is unsatisfied with the lessee's choice of available
markets." ' In such a factual setting the initial question may be whether
the lessee has secured the best price available."' An answer to this query
does not, however, resolve the issue of whether or not the marketing
covenant has been breached."12 Again, the central issue in this situation
is the lessee's compliance with the applicable standard of conduct.
Judicial Response: The Need for Conceptual Clarity
Several recent cases illustrate the difficult time the courts have had
trying to enunciate clear and concise principles in applying the prudent
operator standard to the marketing covenant situation. In Young v.
Dixie Oil Co.," 3 a lessor sought to void two leases based on the lessee's

149. "[Tlhe component duty to market must be tempered by the rule of reason and
prudence." Bristol, 225 F.2d at 897. For a discussion of the elements in a cause of action
for breach of the marketing covenant, see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Okla.
1961); Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304, 310 (Okla. 1954);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 284-88 (Tex. Civ. App. El
Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
151. It is well established that a lessee has a duty to secure the highest price obtainable
for gas being marketed. Craig v. Champlin Ref. Co., 435 F.2d 933, 939 (10th Cir. 1971);
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957); Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957,
975 (S.D. Miss. 1982) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 726 F.2d 225
(5th Cir. 1984); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 470 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Waechter
v. Amoco Prod. Co., 217 Kan. 489, 533, 537 P.2d 228, 264 (1975) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979), writ ref'd
n.r.c. per curiam, 611 S.W. 2d 610 (Tex. 1980); Martin, supra note 20, at 191, n.52;
M. Merrill, supra note 13, at 213; Siefkin, supra note 23, at 182.
152. This principle was emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court in Amoco, 611 S.W.2d
at 610. The court stated that, while it found no reversible error in the lower court's
finding that the lessee had breached the duty to market by selling gas at "substantially
lower than market value",
[t]his holding should not be interpreted as implying an absolute duty to sell gas
at market value under a "proceeds" royalty clause ....
Although, in a proper
factual setting, failure to sell at market value may be relevant evidence of a
breach of the covenant to market in good faith, it is merely probative and is
not conclusive.
Id.
The fact that the lessee has obtained less than the best price, even absent a finding of
breach of the implied marketing covenant does, however, give the lessor a cause of action
for recovery of the price differential. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp.
119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971).
153. 647 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
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failure to market gas, notwithstanding the lessee's payment of the applicable shut-in royalty. 5 4 While clearly accepting the principle that an
implied covenant to market exists, the court never stated the applicable
standard of conduct that governs the lessee's actions.'
The only announced standard of conduct in Young to judge the lessee's activities
was the command to "act diligently."' 5 6 The court also pointed out that
the marketing covenant requires a continuing effort on behalf of the
operator to market the gas. In this case the court concluded that the
lessee's activities, notwithstanding the lack of marketing up to the time
of trial, had been sufficient to meet the "diligence" standard. However,
the court hinted that future delays may not be tolerated because a third
well had been drilled. The court specifically noted that future delays in
marketing might justify a later court finding that a breach had occurred. 117

The confusion engendered by the imposition of the marketing covenant on the lessee is typified by the recent case of Amoco Production
Co. v. First Baptist Church.' The facts illustrate the trend involving
marketing covenant cases which "second guess" a lessee's decision to
enter into a new or amended gas purchase contract which the lessor
59
believes is not the best deal available.
In Amoco Production, the dispute concerned a lessee's decision to

dedicate the lessor's gas wells under a particular long term gas purchase

contract which did not contain a price redetermination clause. Other
wells in the same field were covered by different contracts with other

154. Id. at 236. The court mistakenly called the shut-in royalty payment a "rental,"
possibly because the amount paid was based on the delay rental figures. Both leases were
beyond the primary term.
155. Id. at 237. Professor Martin has noted that many of the marketing covenant
cases do not explicitly embrace the "prudent operator" standard taking into account the
interests of both the lessor and lessee. Martin, supra note 20, at 191.
156. 647 S.W.2d at 237. The court did use a "due diligence" standard, citing Waddle
v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., Inc., 551 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1977). The evidence was apparently
in conflict, but the court concluded that insufficient capacity of the individual wells in
conjunction with the lack of a nearby pipeline proved that the operator was acting
diligently.
157. Young, 647 S.W.2d at 237-38. The court suggests that with three shut-in wells
sufficient quantities of gas were present to justify the expense of constructing the needed
pipeline.
158. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam,
611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
159. See, e.g., Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188 ( W.D. Okla. 1981); Piney
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984); Greenshields
v. Warren Petroleum Coro., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
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purchasers which allowed for significantly higher prices in later years. 6"

The court had no difficulty concluding that the implied covenant to
market imposed some duty on the lessee to reasonably renegotiate the
expired gas purchase contract. However, translating that duty into an

articulated standard of care presented a more formidable task. 6'

The court began its analysis by embracing a "good faith" standard

applicable to the lessee's conduct in marketing the gas and a "really
good faith" standard for situations in which the interests of the lessor
and lessee diverge. 62 The court also included the traditional "prudent
operator" standard, taking into account the interests of both the lessor
and lessee. 63 Added to the melange is the concept of due or reasonable
' 64

diligence which is defined as seeking the "highest price obtainable." '

All of these standards require different kinds of proof. A lessee
who honestly but mistakenly or negligently thinks he has secured the
best price obtainable would meet the good faith standard but would
probably not meet the prudent operator or due diligence standard. The
good faith standard in the absence of self-dealing would seemingly require
proof of the lessee's subjective state of mind. In Amoco Production,
the court measured the lessee's conduct by the existence of comparable
sales made contemporaneously by the lessee and other operators in the
relevant field. Which of the standards should apply in the marketing

covenant situation is not made clear.' 65 However, in an unusual per
curiam refusal of the writ, the Texas Supreme Court seemingly embraced
the good faith standard but added a caveat that no absolute duty to

160. Amoco, 579 S.W.2d at 282-83. At the end of the period in question Amoco was
receiving up to $1.95/MCF from some of its gas purchases in the same field while
plaintiff's gas was being sold at only $.72/MCF. Prior to the 1975 contract gas from
the lessor's well was sold to four different purchasers. After the 1975 contract all of the
gas was sold to one purchaser at the reduced price.
161. Amoco 579 S.W.2d at 284-85. The court mysteriously discusses at great length
the standard of care that governs the lessee's exercise of the pooling power, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiffs did not challenge the creation of the pooled unit in this case.
Even there, however, the court described the pooling power as being governed by the
"utmost good faith standard," the "fairness" standard, and the "good faith" standard,
taking into account the lessor's and lessee's intent standard. The only rule that is clearly
made by the court is that the lessee is not held to a "fiduciary" standard. Amoco, 579
S.W.2d at 284-85 (citing Pritchett v. Forest Oil Corp., 535 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
El Paso 1976)) (writ ref'd n.r.e.); 4 E, Kuntz, supra note 40, at 219.
162. The court says: "We conclude there is an implied covenant to exercise good
faith in the marketing of gas, and particularly so where the interests of the lessor and
lessee are not identical." Id. at 285. See also Martin, supra note 20, at 191.
163. Amoco, 579 S.W.2d at 285 (citing 2 Summers, supra note 23, at 641).
164. Amoco, 579 S.W.2d at 285 (citing M. Merrill, supra note 13, at 212-14).
165. Amoco, 579 S.W.2d at 287-88.
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sell at market value will always exist, especially if the lease contains a
"proceeds" rather than a "market value" royalty clause.'"
While several state court decisions have had difficulty choosing the
appropriate standard to apply, two recent federal decisions applying
Oklahoma 67 and Mississippil 68 law clearly laid out the applicable rule.
In Barby v. Cabot Corp.,' 69 the court held that the lessee is under a
duty "to obtain the best price and terms available."'" 70 The burden of
proof was placed on the lessor to show that the lessee violated the
duty, 7' and the court applied a due diligence or prudent operator
standard. In this case a twenty-two month delay in negotiating an expired
gas purchase contract was held to violate the prudent operator standard. 172
In Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.,'" the court
utilized the prudent operator or due diligence standard in assessing the
actions of the lessee to initially market the newly-discovered gas. The
court clearly set out the elements of the prudent operator standard,
including the due care and diligence duty which must be exercised with

166. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980). Both
the per curiam Supreme Court opinion and the Court of Civil Appeals decision leave
open a very difficult issue, namely, the effect of the nature of the royalty clause on the
implied covenant to market. Amoco argued that because "proceeds" royalties were to be
paid, they were under no duty to sell at the best price available, 579 S.W.2d at 286-87.
This argument was rejected by the Court of Civil Appeals but revived by the per curiam
opinion of the Supreme Court. 611 S.W.2d at 610. See also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946). The duty to receive the highest price obtainable
should clearly attach to a "proceeds" royalty because in the "market value" royalty
situation the lessor is entitled to receive royalty on the market value regardless of the
price for which the lessee sells the gas. Therefore the lessor would not suffer any loss
by an undervalued sale. See generally, Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory
Oil and Gas Law, Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 327 (1980). Professor Harrell notes the
inconsistency or incapability of the implied covenant to market and a market value royalty
clause as it is applied in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
Harrell, supra at 328-30.
167. Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
168. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss.
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
169. 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
170. Id. at 190 (citing Tara Petroleum Corp. v Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981)).
171. Id. The court's job was made easier in that in an earlier unpublished opinion
the court had held that the lessee had been dilatory in renegotiating the same gas purchase
contract. The delay in renegotiating the new gas purchase contract was some twenty-two
months after the expiration of the old contract.
172. Id. This is to be compared with the nine-year delay in the initial marketing of
the gas that was held to be acceptable in Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp. 225 F.2d
894 (10th Cir. 1955).
173. 539 F.Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
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"due regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee."' ' 74 After taking
a "hard look" at the facts and circumstances surrounding the negotiations and signing of the gas purchase contract, the court concluded
that the lessee had acted as a prudent operator in obtaining the best
prices and terms available.' 7 Unlike the lessee in Amoco Production,
the lessee here had bargained for the best terms and price available at
the time of the contract. Thus, Piney Woods represents adherence to
the prudent operator standard, but with a close examination of the
lessee's actions.
The Problem of Self-Dealing: Red Flags for the Court
As with the implied covenant to prevent drainage, the problem of

self-dealing with marketing seemingly alerts a court to a heightened sense
of review regardless of the court's stated standard of conduct.' 76 In
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen,' 77 the court was influenced by what
it deemed to be self-dealing between the lessee and a wholly owned
subsidiary who purchased the gas for resale to third parties. 7 ' While
the court reiterated the First Baptist Church standard of conduct, "highest good faith" or "best of good faith,"' 7 9 the fact that there was selfdealing presents a prima facie case of violating the standard., The

174. 539 F. Supp. at 973-74. For other cases embracing the prudent operator standard
see, Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co. 300 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 421
F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1970); Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller, 272 F.
Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963);
Southwest Gas Prod. Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (Miss. 1966).
175. Piney Woods, 539 F. Supp. at 74-5. The court distinguished both Amoco Prod.
Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, and Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co.,
300 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Okla. 1969), concluding that in both of those cases the lessees
had not exercised due diligence in securing the highest price obtainable.
176. See 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 824.
177. 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1984).
178. Id. at 27-28. Texas Oil and Gas (TXO) as lessee sold the gas to Delhi Pipeline,
a wholly-owned subsidiary, who then processed it and sold it to third parties at prices
which exceeded by $.15/MCF the price contained in the sale from TXO to Delhi. A
division order was signed by the lessors agreeing to be bound by the Delhi-TXO contract.
The lease provided for market value royalties for gas sold or used off of the premises.
Id. at 27 n.l.
179. Id. at 29. The court also cited Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.
Civ. App. Texarkana 1957), writ ref'd n.r.e., cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958), and
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
907 (1957) as grounds for this highest good faith standard. The court infers that a trust
or confidential relationship is created which might lead to fiduciary obligations, as was
suggested by the Texas Supreme Court in Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984)
(as it applies to the exercise of the pooling power).
180. 683 S.W.2d at 29. The court also noted the failure of TXO to disclose to the
lessor its relationship with Delhi and the resale contracts as the basis for finding fraudulent
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court did not lessen the burden on the plaintiff, nor did it shift the
burden of proof once the self-dealing has been shown, but the presence
of the "sham" sale to the subsidiary clearly effected the court's decision
to find a breach of the implied marketing covenant.,"
The Commentators' Review: Three Discordant Analyses
In the recent past, commentators have suggested three standards by
which the lessee's marketing activities should be judged. 8 2 A review of
these three analyses will serve as a basis for the standard proposed by
the authors.
Professor Martin's View: The Good Faith Standard
Professor Martin has forcefully argued that, in reviewing the lessee's
3
marketing activities, courts should return to a good faith standard.'
Martin contends that the prudent operator standard should be modified
in recognition of the fact that "the corporate lessee today has responsibilities in national energy development and environmental protection
that often require it to consider the long term consequences of its actions
without regard to short-term profit ... "I" As he correctly notes, the
lessee's duty to obtain the highest price may force gas into the intrastate
85
market notwithstanding the existence of a greater interstate use.1 Similarly, he contends that by promoting production and not conservation,
the implied covenant to market has thwarted the proper functioning of
market mechanisms and thus has ill-served the nation."'6 Professor Martin
suggests that the lessee should be held to the same standard of conduct

misrepresentations. This was critical because the jury awarded punitive damages which
can only be recovered if a tort is proven, not merely for breach of an implied convenant.
The court talks about the lessee being in a confidential relationship with the lessor and
states that full disclosure is required to avoid a finding of bad faith or overreaching.
Whether full disclosure is required in cases only where there is self-dealing or in all cases
is not discussed by the court.
181. Id. at 28. The court found that TXO had not made any affirmative misrepresentations of fact in the division order but the court nonetheless found a breach of
contract because of the nature of the "sham" transaction. The court looked askance at
a sale which was desined to make the proceeds standard, rather than the market value
standard, apply to the royalties on gas, when third parties were apparently ready and
willing to purchase the gas off of the premises for a price higher than that designated
in the self-dealing contract between Delhi and TXO.
182. Martin, supra note 20, at 190-93, 198-205; Weaver, supra note 11, at 1515-20;
5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 856.3.
183. Martin, supra note 20, at 198-205.
184. Id. at 177,
185. Martin, supra note 20, at 192-3.
186. Id.at 203-04.
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by which corporate officers and directors are generally held.'17 Thus,
he concludes:
It is my proposal that the prudent operator standard be modified
to give due regard to the fact that the lessee must often act
upon its perceptions of its duties under express and implied
governmental policies and public opinion ....
[TIhe proper test
is whether the lessee has acted in good faith and had a reasonable
basis for its, judgment. This is the truer test of the prudent
operator.8 "
Williams' and Meyers' View: The Fluctuating Standard
Although the bases for their opinion is somewhat different, Williams
and Meyers propose that the lessee be judged by a standard of conduct
which "approaches a good faith test."''8 9 Unlike Martin, however, they
propose a fluctuating standard. Where the interests of the lessor and
lessee are aligned, Williams and Meyers propose that "[tihe greatest
possible leeway should be indulged the lessee in his decision about
marketing gas . . . ."90 Where the lessor's and lessee's interests are not
aligned, the authors suggest that closer supervision of the lessee's business
judgment is necessary.' 9 Williams and Meyers suggest a dual standard
because of the potential harm which may be caused by excessive judicial
supervision. They assume that, in the typical marketing covenant case,
the interests of the lessee and lessor are aligned. The authors fear that
scrutiny of lessees' actions by judges or juries, in view of after acquired
knowledge, will encourage operators "to take the least hazardous and
perhaps least profitable course of action."' 92
Professor Weaver's View: The Reasonable Prudent
Operator Standard
Unlike the views of the commentators discussed in the two preceding
sections, Professor Weaver advocates future adherence to the reasonable
prudent operator standard. 93 Weaver acknowledges that federal pricing
94
regulations along with the costly filing requirements of the NGPA1

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
aligned,
192.

Id. at 204.
Id.at 205.
5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at 412.
Id.at 411.
Id.For examples of instances where the interests of the lessor and lessee are not
see supra note 24.
5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 856.3.

193.

Weaver, supra note 11,at 1510-19.

194.

See supra note 3.
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complicate the duty to market and may result in increased litigation of
that covenant,' 9' however, she sees no need to change the current standard. Rather, she favors a reasonable prudent operator standard which,
when properly applied, allows the lessee to exercise his business judgment
when choosing among reasonable alternatives.' 96 Professor Weaver sees
little basis for the fear that courts will, in judging the lessee's marketing
activities, fail to consider the present state of the natural gas industry. 97
She concludes that "[a] good faith subjective standard . . . invites the
needless opportunity to abuse the rational basis of the doctrine of implied
covenants by allowing lessors' royalties to be determined by apparently
sincere, but nonetheless negligent, efforts of lessees."' 9
A Fluctuating Standard: The Better View
Our civilization is still in a middle state, scarcely beast, in that
it is no longer wholly guided by instinct; scarcely human in that
it is not yet wholly guided by reason.
Theodore Driesser
While each of the commentators whose views were discussed in the
preceding sections propose various standards, it is apparent that at least
two see a need for courts to closely consider the facts and circumstances
surrounding a lessee's marketing decision before finding a breach of the
applicable standard of conduct. '" The recent fluctuations in supply and
demand for natural gas, along with the complex pricing system integrated
into the NGPA, make this need even more acute. Recognizing this need,
courts have rightfully begun to consider the above factors when rendering
decisions. 200 The recognition of these factors is merely a nuance which
reflects an awareness of changing market conditions and public policy.
As Justice Holmes noted:

195. Professor Weaver states that "the implied covenant to market ...
may well
experience a revival because of the importance and difficulty of correctly pricing oil and
gas under the-federal regulations." Weaver, supra note II, at 1510.
196. Id. at 1516.
197. Id. at 1515-16.
198. Id. at 1517.
199. See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957
(S.D. Miss. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 726 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1984).
200. See, e.g., Sword v. Rains, 575 F.2d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1978) (court noted
"chaotic and uncertain market conditions" resulting from court case which cast cloud
over applicable provision of NGPA); Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063,
1069 (8th Cir. 1979) (court noted need to encourage domestic development through
application of covenant to further develop). Neither of these cases was a marketing covenant
case. See also, Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Every important principle which is developed in litigation is in
fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy ...

the unconscious result of

instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the
less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis. And
as the law is administered by able and experienced men ...

it

will be found that, when ancient rules maintain themselves ...
new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them,
and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last a
new form, from the grounds to which they have been trans20 1
planted.
It is in this light that a subtle alteration of the lessee's marketing duty
is proposed. Even though a court can take a "hard look" at the facts,
it can still give deference to the ultimate marketing decision. In determining whether the lessee has performed as a reasonably prudent operator, taking into account the interests of both the lessor and lessee,
the court can and should give due deference to the lessee's business
judgment to market the gas. 20 2 Each of the standards proposed in the
preceding sections recognizes the need to give deference to the lessee's
judgment. In fact, the variable in each proposed standard is the degree
of deference which should be given. In the authors' opinion the standard
proposed by Professors Williams and Meyers grants the lessee the correct
amount of deference.
The standard proposed by Professor Martin, on the other hand,
allows the lessee an excessive amount of deference. It is illogical to
allow the lessee to escape liability on a claim alleging breach of the
implied marketing covenant merely by asserting that his error, though
significant, was made in good faith. To allow such a standard of review
places an unreasonable burden upon the lessor to rebut the lessee's state
of mind in all but those cases where the lessee has acted with gross
ignorance or a grievous mistake in judgment. 023 This is not to say that
Professor Martin's suggestions are without merit. Indeed, as suggested
previously, some degree of subjectiveness should necessarily be present
to prevent courts from arbitrarily interfering with the business judgment
of the lessee. 204 This is certainly the case in the law of corporations,
where it has been stated that "[i]t is too well settled to admit of

201. 0. Holmes, The Common Law 32 (1963).
202. Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Ware, 269 Ark. 313, 319, 602 S.W.2d 620, 623 (1980).
This proposed alteration closely tracks the language in Ware. That case, however, was
not a marketing covenant case.
'203.
Cf. 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 371 (1964) (obligee not liable for error due to
honest mistake in judgment absent gross ignorance).
204. Martin, supra note 20, at 201-02.
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controversy that ordinarily neither the directors nor the other officers
of a corporation are liable for mere mistakes or errors of judgment,
either of law or fact." 2 °5 That is, directors should be allowed to take
chances so long as there is no evidence of self dealing, overreaching,
2
fraud, or bad faith. 0
The same could be said of an operator/lessee. In the normal situation
the interests of the lessor and lessee are aligned. Both parties share an
interest in securing a contract as soon as possible on the best available
terms. To allow the trier of fact to second guess the business judgment
of the lessee in such a situation serves only one purpose: it promotes
20
conservatism. '
For these reasons the fluctuating standard proposed by Williams
and Meyers appears to be the most viable standard of conduct by which
to review a lessee's marketing activity. Where the interests of the lessor
and lessee are aligned, the country is ill-served by courts or juries who,
in light of knowledge acquired after the lessee's decision, second guess
the business judgment of the lessee. This is especially true in light of
the complex federal regulatory scheme and the instability of the market.
This does not mean, however, that the lessor should be left with the
burden of proving bad faith. Rather, the lessee should have the burden
of establishing that his actions were taken in good faith. 20 Assuming
a prima facie case of good faith is shown, the burden should shift to
the lessor to rebut the proof set forth.
Where the interests of the lessee and lessor are not aligned, the
application of the higher standard of conduct is justified. This principle
is well established in the law of corporations. In Lewis v. S.L. & E.,
Inc.,2°9 the court noted that "the business judgment rule presupposes
that the directors have no conflict of interest. When a shareholder attacks
a transaction in which the directors have an interest other than as
directors of the corporation, the directors may not escape review of the
merits of the transaction." ' 20° This principle is also well established in

205. 3A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1039 (perm.
ed. 1975); H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 242 (1983).
206. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis
v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 351-54 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (each adopting business
judgment rule).
207. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 13, at § 856.3.
208. Accord Martin, supra note 20, at 202. "Once the lessee has established that (he]
... is acting in good faith (i.e., not in the deliberate disregard of the lessor's interest)
and that there is a reasonable basis for [his] .. . belief," the lessee's interest should not
be subordinated to those of the lessor.
209. 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. Id. at 769. Accord Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir.
1980).
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oil and gas law 2 ' and could easily be engrafted onto the standard of
conduct used to judge a lessee's marketing activities.
In addition to
a sliding scale of deference, the authors believe that a sliding scale
standard of proof should be applied in marketing covenant cases. The
function of having a higher standard is to allocate the risks of an
erroneous judgment between the litigants.2 2 Where litigation is especially
fact-focused, the standard of proof "instructs the fact finder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." ' In cases where there is no conflict of interest between the lessor
and lessee, the lessor should have to prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the lessee has breached the prudent operator standard.
However, where the interests of the lessor and lessee diverge the standard
should be lowered to the normal civil standard of the "preponderance
of the evidence." In cases where it is clear that there is lessee selfdealing, as with the so-called "fraudulent drainage" cases, the authors
suggest that after the lessor has shown a prima facie case of self-dealing,
the burden should shift to the lessee to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that he has met the prudent operator standard.
The combination of substantial deference and the clear and convincing standard of proof should eliminate frivolous litigation brought
by disgruntled lessors who, with the benefit of hindsight, are secondguessing a marketing decision made by a lessee. But it will encourage
litigation where evidence of self-dealing or conflicts of interests are
provable. This strikes a proper balance of the competing values that
are a necessary consequence of the implied covenant to market.
Thus, it would be stated that when a lessor attacks a transaction
in which the lessee has an interest other than that as operator of the
leasehold, the lessee may not escape review of the facts, circumstances,
and practical exigencies of the transaction. Such a standard would retain
the reasonably prudent operator test which generally places the initial
burden of proof on the lessor.
REMEDIES

The two most prevalent remedies available to a lessor upon a showing
of a breach of the marketing covenant are damages and cancellation. 2'4

211. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla.
1969); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 471 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Young v. West
Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304, 309 (Okla. 1954). Accord, Amoco Prod. Co.
v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979), writ ref'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W. 2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
212. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2438 (1984). See also Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1807-08 (1979).
213. 104 S. Ct. at. 2438 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.

concurring).
214.

If the breach of the marketing covenant is also a lack of production under the

19861

IMPLIED MARKETING COVENANTS

An initial issue that must be resolved is whether the damage and cancellation remedies are cumulative or mutually exclusive. The leading case
which supports the view that the remedies are cumulative is Carroll Gas
& Oil Co. v. Skaggs.2 15 The cumulative recovery is based on the theory
that damages are necessary to recoup the losses suffered by the lessee's
past failure to market, while cancellation of the lease is necessary in
order to prevent future damages by the lessee. 2 6 There is nothing inconsistent in pleading and proving both damages and cancellation or
forfeiture of the lease.

2 7

There are, however, several cases which hold that in the absence
of an express forfeiture provision in the lease, the sole remedy available
for breach of the marketing covenant is damages. 281 In Guleke v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co._,29 the court stated that a breach of an implied
covenant relating to development of the premises, including the covenant
220
to diligently market gas, will not sustain an equitable suit for forfeiture.
This was dictum because the court had previously concluded that the
three month delay between discovery and marketing was not a breach
of the implied covenant to market.
In cases involving a failure to initially market the gas, the leading
commentators have long argued for a remedy which prevents the lessor
from reaping a double recovery. 2 2 ' The courts, however, have uniformly
rejected the remedy of interest on the late royalties and have instead
granted the full amount of royalties which would have been paid had
marketing been achieved with due diligence. 22 2 Nonetheless, several de-

habendum clause, then the remedy will automatically be cancellation in Texas-type jurisdiction and will most likely be cancellation even in Oklahoma-type jurisdictions. 4 E.
Kuntz, supra note 40, at 131-2.
215. 231 Ky. 284, 21 S.W.2d 445 (1929).
216. Id. at 292, 21 S.W.2d at 449-50.
217. Id. at 292, 21 S.W.2d at 449-50.
218. Guleke v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo
1939); Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47, on rehearing, 82
Kan. 367, 108 P. 813 (1910).
219. 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1939). The general rule in Texas for
the development covenant is that damages must be shown by the lessor to be inadequate
before an absolute or conditional decree of cancellation will be granted. Slaughter v.
Cities Services Oil Co., 660 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App. 1983).
220. Guleke, 126 S.W.2d at 40 (citing Jacobs v. Robinson, 241 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ.
App. Dallas 1922), aff'd, 113 Tex 231, 254 S.W. 309 (1923)); Grubb v. McAfee, 109
Tex. 527, 212 S.W. 464 (1919); Cheek v. Metzer, 116 Tex. 356, 291 S.W. 860 (1927);
Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co. 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931).
221. 5 H. Williams & Meyers, supra note 13, at § 857; 4 E. Kuntz supra note 40,
at 130.31; Martin, supra note 20, at 184 n. 31.
222. See, e.g., Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 291, 21 S.W.2d 445,
448 (1929); Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626
(1962). In a recent case involving the lessee's loss of access to his well caused by wrongful
acts committed by another operator, the Kansas Supreme Court impliedly adopted a
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cisions have prevented a double recovery by providing some type of
credit or accounting for royalties already paid when the gas is actually

marketed .22
The recent marketing covenant cases which deal with renegotiated
or poorly negotiated gas purchase contracts have uniformly given the
lessor damages when a breach has been found. One of the essential
elements in this type of case is the showing by the lessor that a better
deal was available at the time the contract was entered into. In Amoco
Production, the lessor was able to show several other contemporaneous
gas purchase contracts with better pricing provisions. Damages were
therefore easy to measure by merely computing the price differential
between the other contracts, and the lessor's contract.2 4 Similarly, in
Barby, where damages were caused by the unreasonable delay in renegotiating an expired contract, the damages were the difference between
what was paid under the old contract, during the period of unnecessary
delay, and the prices in the renegotiated contract. 25
The availability of total or conditional cancellation or forfeiture of
the lease as a remedy is intertwined with the habendum clause/marketing
covenant relationship. 2 6 In marketing cases which deal with a total failure
to market the product, one has to identify whether or not the jurisdiction
follows the Texas or Oklahoma approach in interpreting the habendum
clause. In Texas-type jurisdictions, the absence of marketing in the
secondary term automatically terminates the lease in the absence of other
savings provisions. 2 7 But if the lease is being held in the secondary term
by payment of shut-in royalties, should a lessor be allowed to cancel
the lease for a lessor's failure to market? The Guleke opinion would
apparently only allow the lessor to recover damages. The earlier cases
dealing with fixed sum royalties, which can be analogized to the shutin payments, also limit the recovery to damages for breach of the

variant of the interest rule when it overturned a damage verdict for the amount of the
lost oil and held instead that the lessee was only entitled to recover for the delay in
recovery. Since there was no evidence as to the damages caused by the delay, e.g., interest
on the amount of delayed, but still recoverable oil, the lessee had not sustained his burden
of proof on the damages issue. Mai v. Youtsey, 231 Kan. 419, 646 P.2d 475 (1982).
223. See e.g., Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 1285 S.E.2d
2626 (1962); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031
(1928). Professor Kuntz believes that this measure of damages is most appropriate in the
marketing covenant situation. 4 E. Kuntz, supra note 40, at 131.
224. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 282-83 (Tex. Civ.
App. El. Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
225. Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
226. See generally, Williams & Goodwin, Forfeiture of Lease for Failure to Market
Gas, 46 W. Va. L.Q. 271 (1940).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
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marketing covenant. 29 If the marketing covenant is not extinguished by
the payment of shut-in royalties, the lessor should be allowed to seek
a total cancellation of the lease if he can prove that the lessee has
breached his duty to initially market the discovered gas.229
In Oklahoma-type jurisdictions, it is clear that cancellation or forfeiture must be available, otherwise the lessee can keep a lease alive
perpetually by the payment of damages without ever having to market
the discovered gas. In many Oklahoma cases cancellation is perceived
to be an available remedy, but equitable defenses will be available which
limit the courts' use of that remedy. 20 However, many of the equitable
considerations that may be raised by the lessee will be the same considerations used to prove that he acted as a reasonably prudent operator.
Therefore, if it is determined that a breach of the covenant has occurred,
courts should not hesitate to cancel the lease in its entirety.
For breaches of the marketing covenant that are essentially challenges
to the reasonableness of the actual marketing decision, the authors
suggest that only "under extraordinary circumstances ' 23' should the
lessor be entitled to a decree of cancellation. In these cases damages
are readily ascertainable. Moreover, the cancellation remedy would be
too harsh a penalty for a mistake in business judgment. 21 2 However, in
cases where the lessor can show self-dealing or fraud, cancellation would
be an appropriate remedy in order to "punish" the wrong-doer.
CONCLUSION

The implied marketing covenant arose to resolve some of the conflicts
which arise between the lessor and lessee after a commercial well has

228. Guleke, 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1930); Howerton v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47, on rehearing, 82 Kan. 367, 108 P. 813 (1910).
See also, Hurst v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 221 Ky. 786, 299 S.W. 954 (1927);
McGraw Oil & Gas Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027 (1909).
229. Professors Williams & Meyers cogently argue that total cancellation is appropriate
in marketing covenant cases, rejecting the conditional and partial cancellation decrees
usually found in exploration and development cases. 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra
note 13, at § 857.
230. See, e.g., Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 332 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1958); Strange
v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 P. 347 (1920). See also, Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526,
63 P.2d 1022 (1936); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187 (1933); Pryor
Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 P. 570 (1924).
231. W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 518, 19 S.W.2d 27, 29
(1929). See also, Slaughter v. Cities Service Oil Co., 660 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Ct. App.
Amarillo 1983), Wes-Tex Land Co. v. Simmons, 566 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. Civ. App.
Eastland 1978) (writ ref'd n.r.e.); Guinn v. Clay, 324 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) (error ref'd n.r.e).
232. See, e.g., Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
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been completed. Through nearly one hundred years of use, the covenant
has been adapted to meet the complexities presented by the changing
industry. Recent developments may soon effectuate increased use of the
covenant, thus necessitating a reevaluation of the implied marketing
covenant. In light of the increased pressures placed upon the lessee by
federal regulations and the downturn in demand, any reevaluation should
focus on the standard of conduct and standard of proof by which a
lessees' marketing activities are to be judged. More specifically, the
continued viability of the reasonably prudent operator standard should
be reviewed.
The case law reveals that actions grounded on the implied marketing
covenant are decided after the trier of fact considers the circumstances
and practical exigencies of the case. So too should the covenant itself
be reviewed. Such analysis reveals that in those instances where the
parties to a lease share a common interest in production, the lessee
should be allowed to exercise his business judgment without fear of
being second guessed by judge or jury. The increase of the standard of
proof to a "clear and convincing" evidence level achieves a compromise
with which both lessors and operators can live.

